We consider the temporal language with the Priorean operators G and H expressing that a formula is true at all future times and all past times, plus an operator 2 expressing that a formula is true throughout some open interval containing the evaluation time (i.e., it is true 'around now'). We show that the logic of real numbers time in this language is finitely axiomatisable, answering an implicit question of Shehtman (1993) . We also show that the logic has PSPACE-complete complexity, but is not Kripke complete and has no strongly complete axiomatisation.
Introduction
Modal formulas can be given semantics in models based on topological spaces. In a topological model, the formula 2ϕ is true at a point if ϕ is true throughout some open neighbourhood of that point. So the set of points satisfying 2ϕ is the interior of the set of points satisfying ϕ. Topological semantics predates Kripke semantics and was first considered by McKinsey and Tarski [16] , who proved that the logic of any separable dense-in-itself metric space, such as the rationals (Q) and reals (R) with the usual topology, is S4. Interest in this theorem is undergoing a renaissance and several simpler proofs have recently appeared [17, 18, 2, 1, 14, 7] , either for R alone or for the general case. The theorem was extended by Kremer [9, 10] to a strong completeness result (for countable languages).
Additional connectives have also been considered. Shehtman added the universal modality ∀: a formula ∀ϕ is true at an arbitrary point of a topological model if ϕ is true at every point. He showed [25] that the logic of any connected separable densein-itself metric space, such as R, is S4UC, with S4 axioms for 2, the usual axioms U for ∀, and a connectedness axiom C, namely ∀(2p ∨ 2¬p) → ∀p ∨ ∀¬p.
Kudinov added the difference operator [ =]: a formula [ =]ϕ is true at a point if
ϕ is true at every other point. The difference operator is more expressive than ∀. In the language with 2, [ =], Kudinov axiomatised the logic of all topological spaces, all dense-in-themselves topological spaces, and any zero-dimensional dense-in-itself metric space [11] . He also axiomatised the logic of R n for n ≥ 2 (unpublished), but proved (also unpublished: see [12] ) that the logic of R is not finitely axiomatisable, and not even axiomatisable by formulas using finitely many variables in total.
In [24] , Shehtman shifted attention to temporal logic by adding the Priorean temporal connectives G and H to the original 2. This language is given semantics in ordered topological models. An ordered topological model is a topological model whose topology is the interval topology arising from an irreflexive linear order < on the set of points. Examples include models based on Q and R with their usual orderings and topologies. Such models can be viewed temporally. We can regard the points as times and the order < as the earlier-later relation, so that x < y denotes that x is in the past of y and y in the future of x. A formula Gϕ is true at a point or time x in such a model iff ϕ is true at all future times -all y satisfying x < y. A formula Hϕ is true at x if ϕ is true at all past times y < x. Together, the connectives G, H are even more expressive than [ =] . In the temporal context, 2ϕ can still be read topologically, but it also has a reasonable temporal reading as 'ϕ is true around now', and this view was promulgated by Scott. In [24] , Shehtman gave a finite axiomatisation of the logic of Q in this language, observed that the logic of R in the same language is decidable, and implicitly posed [24, p.256 ] the problem of axiomatising it. Although the area of topological semantics of modal logic has recently attracted a good deal of attention, this problem has remained open.
Although it has no topological 2-modality, the very expressive temporal language with U and S (Until and Since) is worth mentioning here. A formula U (ϕ, ψ) is true at a time point x if there is a point y > x at which ϕ is true and such that ψ is true at every z with x < z < y -informally, ψ is true until ϕ becomes true. The meaning of S is obtained by swapping < with >. The connectives U and S were introduced by Kamp [8] and they can easily express all the connectives we have considered so far. Indeed, over R, they can express every connective whose meaning is definable in first-order logic [8] . Reynolds gave a finite axiomatisation of the logic of R with U, S in [20] , and showed the logic to be PSPACE-complete in [21] .
In the current paper we consider Shehtman's temporal language with G, H, and 2, interpreted over R. We answer Shehtman's implicit question [24] by showing that the logic of R in this language is finitely axiomatisable. Given Kudinov's result, this is perhaps surprising, but given Reynolds's, it is less so. It suggests that G, H, and 2 are in some sense closer to Until and Since over R than to [ =] and 2. We only obtain 'weak completeness', and we show that no strong completeness result can be proven. We also show that the logic is not Kripke compete. Shehtman observed in [24] that it is decidable, and we show that it is PSPACE-complete.
Our axiom system is similar to the one for Q given by Shehtman in [24] -the only difference is that we include an additional connectedness axiom F (p ∧ F q) ∧ F (¬p ∧ F q) → F (3p ∧ 3¬p ∧ F q) -and our completeness proof starts in the same way by a certain filtration of the canonical model. We then apply selective filtration 1 .
is a formula.
2. Every p ∈ P V is a formula.
3. If ϕ, ψ are formulas then so are ¬ϕ, ϕ ∧ ψ, Gϕ, Hϕ, and 2ϕ.
The mirror image of a formula ϕ is the formula obtained by replacing every G in ϕ by H, and every H in ϕ by G. As abbreviations we let
, F ϕ = ¬G¬ϕ, P ϕ = ¬H¬ϕ, and 3ϕ = ¬2¬ϕ.
Semantics over R
We define semantics for L-formulas over R as follows. Let h : P V → ℘(R) be an assignment to atoms (where ℘ denotes power-set). Then for each x ∈ R and formula ϕ we define (R, h), x |= ϕ by induction:
A formula ϕ is said to be satisfiable over R if there exist an assignment h : P V → ℘(R) and x ∈ R with (R, h), x |= ϕ. We say that ϕ is valid over R if ¬ϕ is not satisfiable over R. A set Σ of L-formulas is said to be satisfiable over R if there exist an assignment h : P V → ℘(R) and x ∈ R with (R, h), x |= ϕ for every ϕ ∈ Σ. The L-logic of R is the set of all L-formulas that are valid over R.
Kripke semantics
Formulas have an alternative Kripke semantics. A binary relation on a set W is a subset of W × W . A Kripke frame for L is a triple (W, <, R), where W is a nonempty set and <, R are binary relations on W . (In the main proof, < will always be transitive but not always irreflexive.) Given an assignment h : P V → ℘(W ), the tuple M = (W, <, R, h) is called a Kripke model for L. For w ∈ W , we define M, w |= ϕ by induction on formulas ϕ:
Let F = (W, <, R) be a Kripke frame, and M = (W, <, R, h) a Kripke model. A formula ϕ is said to be satisfiable in M if there is w ∈ W with M, w |= ϕ, and satisfiable in F if there are h : P V → ℘(W ) and w ∈ W with (W, <, R, h), w |= ϕ. A formula ϕ is said to be valid in F (resp. M) if ¬ϕ is not satisfiable in F (resp. M).
General definitions
For a map f : X → Y , and X ⊆ X, we write f (X ) for {f (x) : x ∈ X }. We write dom f for X and rng f for f (X).
DEFINITION 2.1 Let W be a set, and R a binary relation on it.
1. For w, u ∈ W , we write any of Rwu, w R u, R(w, u) to indicate that (w, u) ∈ R.
2. We let R • denote the binary relation on W defined by R • wu iff Rwu ∧ ¬Ruw.
3. For w ∈ W we write R(w) = {u ∈ W : Rwu}.
4.
A subset X ⊆ W is said to be R-generated if R(x) ⊆ X for every x ∈ X.
5. For X ⊆ W , we write R X for the binary relation R ∩ (X × X) on X.
) be a Kripke model.
1. We write u ≤ w to abbreviate u < w ∨ u = w.
2. An element w ∈ W is said to be <-reflexive if w < w, and <-irreflexive, otherwise.
3. A <-cluster of/in M is a maximal non-empty subset C ⊆ W such that w < u for all w, u ∈ C. This usage of 'cluster' is slightly different from that in (e.g.) [24] . We remark that if < is transitive, any <-reflexive point w ∈ W lies in a unique <-cluster, namely, {u ∈ W : w < u < w}. We leave the proof as an exercise.
4. A submodel of M is a Kripke model N = (W , < , R , h ), where W ⊆ W , < = < W , R = R W , and h (p) = W ∩ h(p) for every atom p ∈ P V . For Kripke models M, N , we write N ⊆ M to denote that N is a submodel of M.
5. Such a submodel of M is said to be an R-generated submodel if W is an Rgenerated subset of W , and a <-generated submodel if W is both a <-generated and >-generated subset of W .
6. We say that N is a generated submodel of M if it is both an R-generated and a <-generated submodel of M.
It is well known, and easily proved by induction on ϕ, that if N is a generated submodel of M, and w ∈ W , then N , w |= ϕ iff M, w |= ϕ for every L-formula ϕ.
Axioms
We now present a Hilbert system that, as we will show, axiomatises the L-logic of R.
It is based on a system of Shehtman [24, §2] that was shown to axiomatise the L-logic of Q. The only difference is that we have added a 'connectedness' axiom, axiom 5.
The system
The axioms are as follows. We assume familiarity with Sahlqvist formulas in temporal logic: see, e.g., [3] . The axioms 2-4 are Sahlqvist formulas and their first-order correspondents are reproduced below. (The correspondent of each normality axiom is equivalent to , and omitted.) Each correspondent is true in a Kripke frame iff the axiom is valid in the frame. Moreover, the correspondents are true in the frame of the canonical model of the logic axiomatised by the system.
all propositional tautologies
2. axioms for dense linear time without endpoints:
4. Shehtman's 'special axioms':
6. all mirror images of the above axioms (swap G with H, and F with P ; also swap < with > in the correspondents).
The rules of inference are the standard ones:
1. modus ponens:
Some mirror images, such as Hp → HHp, are redundant and can be omitted. We have not investigated the exact extent to which this can be done.
As usual, the logic axiomatised by this system is the smallest set S of L-formulas that contains every axiom listed above and is closed under the rules of inference. We say that an L-formula ϕ is provable in the system if ϕ ∈ S. A set Γ of L-formulas is consistent if ¬(γ 0 ∧ . . . ∧ γ n−1 ) / ∈ S for every n < ω and γ 0 , . . . , γ n−1 ∈ Γ, and maximal consistent if it is consistent but has no proper consistent extension.
We aim to show that S is the L-logic of R. The inclusion '⊆' (soundness) is straightforward:
The system is sound over R.
Proof (sketch). All axioms other than axiom 5 are shown to be valid over any dense flow of time without endpoints in [24, lemma 2.2(2)]. Axiom 5 is valid over R because every interval of R is connected. Indeed, assume for contradiction that for some model (R, h) and t ∈ R we have
It is easily seen that each case contradicts the definition of s.
The inference rules obviously preserve validity. 2 3.2 Simple theorems of the system LEMMA 3.2 F and P are provable in the system.
Proof. As is a tautology, it is provable, and we get 2 by 2-generalisation. By axiom 4d, we prove F . We prove P similarly. 2 LEMMA 3.3 G¬p ∧ HF p → 3p is provable in the system.
Proof. We can prove G¬p ∧ 2¬p → 2G¬p by axiom 4c. By the mirror image of axiom 4d we have 2G¬p → P G¬p. Using propositional tautologies we deduce G¬p ∧ 2¬p → ¬HF p, and then the result. The connectedness axiom (5) has an important consequence: the well known Prior axiom
We will prove this using the following lemma. Proof. The following are provable:
Gq-instance of dual of axiom 4b (Hp → H2p) 3. GP 3Gq → GP Gq from previous by G-gen and normality 4. P Gq → q dual of temporal axiom p → HF p 5. GP Gq → Gq from previous by G-gen and normality
The result now follows from lines 1, 3, and 5 by propositional tautologies. The second theorem is a mirror image. 2 COROLLARY 3.5 The Prior axiom F q ∧ F G¬q → F (G¬q ∧ HF q) and its mirror image are provable in the system.
Proof. We give a more informal proof along the lines of the preceding lemma. Assume F q ∧ F G¬q. Using the density axiom, this yields F F q ∧ F G¬q. Taking p = G¬q and q = in axiom 5 gives
. By lemma 3.2, F is equivalent to , so this reduces to
So we obtain F (3G¬q ∧ 3F q). Now by standard temporal logic, we can prove F q → HF (F q) and HF (F q) → HF q. This gives us F (3G¬q ∧ 3HF q). By lemma 3.4, we obtain F (G¬q ∧ HF q) as required. The mirror image can be derived similarly. 2 4 Some facts about the L-logic of R Here we prove some fairly straightforward results about the L-logic of R.
A Hilbert system (of axioms and rules) is said to be sound if all satisfiable formulas are consistent, and strongly complete if any consistent set of formulas using in all only countably many atoms is satisfiable. THEOREM 4.1 There is no sound and strongly complete Hilbert system for the L-logic of R.
Proof. Let Σ be the following set of formulas written with atoms p, q, r:
It is easy to see that any finite subset of Σ is satisfiable over R. However, Σ itself is not satisfiable over R. For suppose that Σ is satisfied at 0 and r ∧ G¬r is true at 1, say. By the first and third formulas, each x ∈ [0, 1] belongs to some open interval I x ⊆ R with I x ⊆ h(p) or I x ⊆ h(q). By the Heine-Borel theorem, [0, 1] is compact, so there are n < ω and
By the final set of formulas, there are 0 < y 0 < y 1 < · · · < y n ≤ 1 with y j / ∈ h(p) if j is even and y j / ∈ h(q) if j is odd (each j ≤ n). Now by the pigeonhole principle and convexity of the I x , there are i, j < n with y j , y j+1 ∈ I x i . But
If the L-logic of R had a sound and strongly complete Hilbert system, then since Σ is finitely satisfiable, it would be consistent and so satisfiable, contradicting the above.
2
We now consider Kripke completeness. I would like to thank Nick Bezhanishvili for helpful discussions on this material. We will consider the following formula ϕ, where a, b are atoms:
LEMMA 4.2 ϕ is satisfiable over R, but is not satisfiable in any Kripke model whose frame validates the L-logic of R.
) be a Kripke model such that every L-formula that is valid over R is also valid in the frame F = (W, <, R). Let w ∈ W and assume for contradiction that M, w |= ϕ.
Plainly, M, w |= 3a ∧ 3b, so there are u, v ∈ R(w) with M, u |= a and M, v |= b. By theorem 3.1, the axioms in §3.1 are all valid in F. By axiom 4a, we have u > w ∨ u = w ∨ u < w. As M, w |= H¬a ∧ ¬a, we cannot have u ≤ w. So u > w. Similarly, v > w. By axiom 4b, u < v < u < u.
As M, w |= F G¬a, we can choose x ∈ W with w < x and M, x |= G¬a. Let g : P V → W be an assignment with g(p) = {u}, and let N = (W, <, R, g). Since g(p) ⊆ h(a), we have N , x |= G¬p, so N , w |= F p ∧ F G¬p. But by corollary 3.5 (or because it is valid in R), the Prior axiom (1) is valid in F, so N , w |= F (G¬p ∧ HF p). Hence there is y ∈ W with w < y and
By lemma 3.3, N , y |= 3p. So Ryu. But also, u < v, so by axiom 4c we obtain Ryv ∨ y < v. If Ryv, then both u, v ∈ R(y), so M, y |= 3a ∧ 3b. Since w < y, we obtain M, w |= F (3a ∧ 3b), contradicting that M, w |= ϕ. If instead y < v, then since v < u we have N , y |= F p, contradicting (3). Either way, our assumption that M, w |= ϕ has led to a contradiction.
Recall that a modal logic L is said to be Kripke complete (respectively, to have the finite model property) if there exists a class K of (resp. finite) Kripke frames such that L is the set of all modal formulas that are valid in every frame in K. Proof. If the L-logic of R were the logic of a class K of Kripke frames of the form (W, <, R), then as the formula ϕ of (2) is satisfiable over R, it would be satisfiable over a frame in K, which therefore (by the lemma) could not validate the logic of R. 2
As N. Bezhanishvili has observed, the L-logic of R is a 'naturally occurring' example of a non-Kripke complete logic. As the finite model property is often used to show decidability, it may be surprising that the L-logic of R is decidable [24, p. 256] . We end the section by establishing its complexity.
THEOREM 4.4
The problem of deciding whether an L-formula is valid over R is PSPACE-complete.
Proof (sketch). We assume knowledge of temporal logic with Until and Since (U, S) as in [21] , where it is proved that the problem of determining satisfiability over R of a formula written with U, S is PSPACE-complete. Given an L-formula ϕ, introduce a new propositional atom q ψ for each subformula ψ of ϕ, and define the formula ψ as follows, where ∀ψ abbreviates ψ ∧ ¬U (¬ψ, ) ∧ ¬S(¬ψ, ):
Let ϕ * be the conjunction of all ψ for subformulas ψ of ϕ, together with q ϕ . It can be checked that ϕ is satisfiable over R iff ϕ * is, and ϕ * can be constructed from ϕ in polynomial time. Given ϕ, we may construct ϕ * and then decide its satisfiability over R in PSPACE [21] . The combined procedure can be done in polynomial space, so the satisfiability, and hence the validity, of ϕ can be decided in PSPACE. The logic of R with 2 alone is S4 [16] , which is already PSPACE-hard [13] . 2
Linear orders and maps
Here we recall from [4] a simple way to build maps defined on intervals of R. It will be needed only at the end of the next section, but we present it now to avoid breaking the flow later.
A linear order is a structure (I, <), where I is a non-empty set and < is an irreflexive transitive binary relation on I that is also linear: that is, (I, <) |= ∀xy(x < y∨x = y∨x > y). We often write (I, <) simply as I. As usual we let x ≤ y abbreviate x < y ∨ x = y. See, e.g., [23] for information about linear orders.
An interval of I is a non-empty convex subset of I. We use standard notation for intervals: if x, y ∈ I and x ≤ y then (x, y) = {z ∈ I :
etc. An open interval is one with no least or greatest element. In this section, we write ordered pairs in the form i, j where they might be confused with intervals.
Lexicographic sums of linear orders
Let (J, <) be a linear order, and for each j ∈ J let I j be an interval of R. (More generally, I j can be any linear order, but we are only concerned with the case of intervals of R.) We write
and define an order < on I lexicographically by i, j < i , j iff j < j or (j = j and i < i ). Clearly, (I, <) is a linear order. If (J, <) = ({0, 1, . . . , n}, <) for some n ∈ N (n ≥ 0), we can write I explicitly as I 0 + · · · + I n . It is plain that if I 0 has a greatest element and I 1 has no least element, or if I 0 has no greatest element and I 1 has a least element, then I 0 + I 1 is order-isomorphic to an interval of R. More generally:
PROPOSITION 5.1 Suppose that one of the following holds.
1. J is finite, say (J, <) = ({0, 1, . . . , n}, <) for some n < ω. I 0 has no least or greatest element. Each I j for j > 0 has a least element but no greatest element.
2. (J, <) = (Z, <) and each I j has a least element and no greatest element.
3. (J, <) = (R, <), each I j has a least and a greatest element, and I j is a singleton for every irrational j.
Then ( j∈J I j , <) ∼ = (R, <).
Proof. A linear order is isomorphic to (R, <) iff it is dense, has no endpoints, has a countable dense subset, and is Dedekind complete. It is well known and easy to check that each of the three sum-orders above has these properties. Cf. [4, 23] . 2
When J and the I j meet one of the conditions in proposition 5.1, the linear order (I, <) is isomorphic to (R, <), and we will generally identify the two.
Functions on linear orders
We continue to let (J, <) be a linear order and I j (j ∈ J) an interval of R. Let S be an arbitrary non-empty set and for each j ∈ J let f j : I j → S be a map. We define a map
In the case where (J, <) = ({0, 1, . . . , n}, <), we may write the sum explicitly as f 0 + · · · + f n . If I j is a singleton {x} and f j (x) = s, say, we may write the map f j simply as s.
EXAMPLE 5.2 If s 0 , . . . , s n ∈ S then, modulo a renaming of the elements of its domain, s 0 + · · · + s n is the map f : {0, . . . , n} → S given by f (i) = s i for each i ≤ n.
For j ∈ J we define dom f (f j ) = I j × {j} ⊆ I. We may sometimes regard f j as a map
In effect, we identify f j with f dom f (f j ).
Shuffles
There is an important special case known as the shuffle. Reynolds [21] described a shuffle as a 'thorough mixture' of its ingredients. Let K be a countable (possibly empty) set of intervals of R each of which has a least and a greatest element, and suppose that K 0 is a singleton interval of R.
for each j ∈ R, so that f j : I j → S, and let
if for all x ∈ I there are y, z ∈ Y with y < x < z.
LEMMA 5.4 Let σ be as above. Then σ −1 (s) is unbounded in dom σ for each s ∈ rng(σ).
A point x ∈ dom(σ) = j∈R I j is said to be a σ-endpoint if it is of the form i, j , where j ∈ R and i is the least or greatest element of I j , and a σ-irrational if x ∈ dom σ (g K 0 ). (Every σ-irrational is a σ-endpoint as well.) LEMMA 5.5 Let σ be as above, and let x, y, z ∈ dom σ with y < x < z.
Proof. Suppose x = i, j , say, where i is the least element of I j . If y = i , j , then we must have j < j. Let s ∈ rng σ be given. Pick K ∈ K ∪ {K 0 } and k ∈ K with g K (k) = s. As θ −1 (K) is dense in R, we may pick j * ∈ θ −1 (K) with j < j * < j. Then y < k, j * < x and σ( k, j * ) = s. It follows that σ((y, x)) = rng σ. A similar argument shows that if i is maximal in I j then σ((x, z)) = rng σ. The lemma is easily derived from this.
By proposition 5.1(3), the linear order ( j∈R I j , <) is isomorphic to (R, <), so by choosing a suitable isomorphism we can regard σ as a map σ : R → S. This map depends on the choices of the isomorphism and θ, but any choices will do for us and in fact all choices lead to the same result modulo an automorphism (order-preserving permutation) of (R, <). So we let Shuffle {g K : K ∈ K} ; g K 0 denote a map σ : R → S as above, for arbitrary tacit choices of these items. The maps g K (for K ∈ K ∪ {K 0 }) are called the ingredients of the shuffle. EXAMPLE 5.6 If a, b, c ∈ S then Shuffle({a, b}; c) can be taken to be a map σ : R → {a, b, c} such that σ −1 (c) = R \ Q and σ −1 (a), σ −1 (b) are dense sets of rationals.
S4 frames
We now use lexicographic sums to establish a relative of the McKinsey-Tarski theorem that the logic of R in the language with 2 is S4 [16] . It will be needed in §6.7. A similar method is used in [7] to prove the McKinsey-Tarski theorem itself, and others.
An S4-frame is a pair (W, R), where R is a reflexive and transitive binary relation on the non-empty set W . Recall from definition 2.1 that R(w) = {u ∈ W : Rwu} for w ∈ W . DEFINITION 5.7 Let (W, R) be an S4-frame, (I, <) a linear order, and g : I → W a map. We say that an element x ∈ I is • g-fair if there are y, z ∈ I with y < x < z and such that g((y , z )) = R(g(x)) for every y , z ∈ I with y ≤ y < x < z ≤ z,
• g-good if there are y, z ∈ I with y < x < z and such that g((y , x)) = g((x, z )) = R(g(x)) for every y , z ∈ I with y ≤ y < x < z ≤ z.
REMARK 5.8 Fairness and goodness are clearly 'local' properties depending only on arbitrarily small neighbourhoods of the point in question. So if g = j∈J f j , j ∈ J, and x ∈ dom g (f j ) is not an endpoint of dom g (f j ), then x is g-fair iff it is f jfair, and g-good iff it is f j -good. (Recall here that we identify f j with g dom g (f j ).) DEFINITION 5.9 An S4-frame (W, R) is said to be connected if there do not exist non-empty disjoint R-generated subsets X, Y ⊆ W with W = X ∪ Y . THEOREM 5.10 Let F = (W, R) be a finite connected S4-frame. Then there is a map g : R → W satisfying:
2. for each w ∈ W , the set {x ∈ R : g(x) = w, x is g-good} is unbounded in R.
(Consequently, g −1 (w) is unbounded in R.)
Proof. Recall that R • wu means that Rwu ∧ ¬Ruw. As F is finite, we can define for each w ∈ W a map ν w : R → W by complete induction on |R • (w)|:
This is well defined because |R • (u)| < |R • (w)| for each u ∈ R • (w), the domain of each map w + ν u + w and of each map u can be taken to be an interval of R with a least and a greatest point (for u it is a singleton interval), and the map w can be taken to be defined on a singleton interval of R.
Claim.
1. rng(ν w ) = R(w).
2. Every x ∈ R is ν w -fair.
3. Every ν w -irrational is ν w -good.
Proof of claim. The proof is by induction on |R • (w)|. Inductively assume the claim for ν u , for all u ∈ R • (w). For (1), let u ∈ R(w) be given. If Ruw, the map u is an ingredient of the shuffle defining ν w , and ν w (x) = u for any x ∈ dom νw (u). So u ∈ rng(ν w ). If instead u ∈ R • (w), then inductively, u ∈ R(u) = rng(ν u ). Since w + ν u + w is another ingredient of ν w , we have rng(ν u ) ⊆ rng(ν w ). So again, u ∈ rng(ν w ). Part 1 is proved. Now take x ∈ R and suppose that ν w (x) = u, say. For part 2, we show that x is ν w -fair. If x is a ν w -endpoint, then the definition of ν w tells us that either u = w, or Rwu and Ruw. In both cases, R(u) = R(w). By lemma 5.5 and part 1, whenever y < x < z we have ν w ((y, z)) = rng(ν w ) = R(w) = R(u).
It follows that x is ν w -fair. If x is not a ν w -endpoint, then x is in the interior of the domain of ν u for some u ∈ R • (w). Inductively, x is ν u -fair, and hence (see remark 5.8) it is ν w -fair as well. For part 3, suppose that x is a ν w -irrational. Then x is a ν w -endpoint, so by the above, R(u) = rng(ν w ). By lemma 5.5, ν w ((y, x)) = ν w ((x, z)) = R(u) whenever y < x < z, so plainly x is ν w -good. This proves the claim. Now F is connected and R is reflexive and transitive. It follows that F is pathconnected in the sense that for each u, v ∈ W there are w 0 , . . . , w n ∈ W (for some finite n) with w 0 = u, w n = v, R(w i , w i+1 ) for each even i < n, and R(w i+1 , w i ) for each odd i < n. Using this and the finiteness of F, it is straightforward to find an infinite zigzag path through F that visits each point infinitely often. Formally, there are u i , d i ∈ W (i ∈ Z) satisfying:
• for each w ∈ W , the set {i ∈ Z : u i = w} is unbounded in Z.
We now define our desired map g : R → W by
Since the domain of each u i + ν u i + u i + ν d i has a least element and no greatest one, it follows from proposition 5.1 that dom(g) is order-isomorphic to (R, <), and as usual we identify the two.
Let x ∈ R be arbitrary. We show that it is g-fair. Fix the unique i ∈ Z such that
As in §5.2, we identify u i +ν u i +u i +ν d i with g dom g (u i +ν u i +u i +ν d i ). If x ∈ dom ν u i then it is ν u i -fair by the claim, and hence (remark 5.8) g-fair. The case where x ∈ ν d i is similar. Suppose x is in the domain of the second u i in (4). Take y ∈ dom ν u i and z ∈ dom ν d i , so that y < x < z. By lemma 5.4 and part 1 of the claim, whenever y ≤ y < x we have g((y , x)) = rng(ν u i ) = R(u i ), and whenever x < z ≤ z we have
). It follows that x is g-fair as required. A similar argument covers the case where x is in the domain of the first u i in (4). We simply note that the left and right neighbours of x are then ν d i−1 and ν u i , respectively, and that Ru i d i−1 . So in all cases, x is g-fair.
Finally, let w ∈ W and r ∈ R. The set {i ∈ Z : u i = w} is unbounded in Z, so we can take i ∈ Z such that u i = w and r < x for all x ∈ dom g (u i + ν u i + u i + ν d i ). Take an ν u i -irrational x. By the last part of the claim, x is ν u i -good and hence (remark 5.8) g-good. Also, g(x) = w and x > r. So {x ∈ R : g(x) = w, x is g-good} has no upper bound, and a symmetrical argument shows that it has no lower bound either. 2 
Completeness proof
In this section we will prove the main result of the paper:
The system of §3.1 axiomatises the L-logic of R.
Soundness was shown in theorem 3.1. The proof of completeness will occupy most of the rest of the paper. We will take a consistent formula ϕ 0 and successively construct models M 0 , . . . , M 5 satisfying it, the final one being a model over R. The models M 0 -M 2 are exactly as in Shehtman's axiomatisation of the logic of F, P, 2 over Q in [24] . For i < 5, M i will be a Kripke model (W i , < i , R i , h i ), but sometimes we drop the index i. Also, we sometimes identify (notationally) M i with its domain W i .
1. M 0 is the canonical model.
2. M 1 is a <-generated submodel of M 0 satisfying ϕ 0 . So it is linear and R 0 -generated.
3. M 2 is got by filtrating all <-clusters of M 1 , which consequently become finite.
4. M 3 is a finite R-generated submodel of M 2 got by selective filtration for <.
We use linearity and the Prior axiom.
5. M 4 satisfies M 3 ⊆ M 4 ⊆ M 2 (any such model satisfies ϕ 0 ), and is obtained using the Prior axiom and induction. It has the property that every two consecutive <-clusters C, D in M 4 either have an intervening irreflexive point or share a common configuration (a submodel with certain properties).
6. Finally M 5 is a model of the form (R, h 5 ). Using theorem 5.10, we will construct a surjective map g : R → M 4 such that if we define h 5 (p) = g −1 (h 4 (p)) for each atom p, then g : (R, h 5 ) → M 4 preserves ϕ 0 both ways. So we have our model of ϕ 0 over R. Now to the details. Let ϕ 0 be an L-formula consistent with the system defined in §3. Fix a finite set Ψ of formulas containing and P ϕ 0 and closed under taking subformulas.
Model M 0
This is just the canonical model of the system given in §3.1, over the set P V of atoms. So W 0 is the set of all maximal consistent sets of L-formulas. We write Γ, ∆, Ξ, Θ, . . . for arbitrary members of W 0 . The relations and assignment are defined by:
• Γ < 0 ∆ iff ϕ ∈ ∆ for every formula Gϕ ∈ Γ (this is equivalent to each of the three statements ϕ ∈ ∆ ⇒ F ϕ ∈ Γ, Hϕ ∈ ∆ ⇒ ϕ ∈ Γ, and ϕ ∈ Γ ⇒ P ϕ ∈ ∆),
• Γ R 0 ∆ iff ϕ ∈ ∆ for every formula 2ϕ ∈ Γ (equivalently, ϕ ∈ ∆ ⇒ 3ϕ ∈ Γ),
• h 0 (p) = {Γ ∈ W 0 : p ∈ Γ} for each atom p ∈ P V .
We assume familiarity with basic facts about canonical models -see, e.g., [5, 3] for details. The most important one is that M 0 , Γ |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ Γ, for each Γ ∈ M 0 and each L-formula ϕ.
LEMMA 6.2 Every < 0 -cluster in M 0 is an R 0 -generated subset of W 0 .
Proof. Let C be such a cluster. Let Γ ∈ C, so that C = {Θ ∈ W 0 : Γ < 0 Θ < 0 Γ}. Let ∆ ∈ W 0 and assume that R 0 Γ∆. We have Γ < 0 Γ R 0 ∆, so by axiom 4b we obtain Γ < 0 ∆. Similarly, Γ > 0 Γ R 0 ∆, so by the mirror image of axiom 4b we get Γ > 0 ∆. Hence, ∆ ∈ C. 2
Model M 1
As ϕ 0 is consistent, we can take Γ 0 ∈ M 0 containing ϕ 0 . Let M 1 be the submodel of M 0 with domain
It follows from the transitivity and linearity axioms for G, H that M 1 is a < 0 -generated and > 0 -generated submodel of M 0 . By axiom 4a, it is also R 0 -generated. Hence, M 1 is a generated submodel of M 0 , so M 1 , Γ 0 |= ϕ 0 and ϕ 0 is satisfied in M 1 . Note that M 1 is linear in that M 1 |= ∀xy(x = y ∨ x < y ∨ y < x); more than one disjunct can hold.
Proof. Let C be such a cluster. Now M 1 is a generated submodel of M 0 , so C is also a < 0 -cluster in M 0 . By lemma 6.2, C is an R 0 -generated subset of W 0 , so since
This is a certain filtration of M 1 through Ψ, invented by Shehtman [24, §3].
Definition of M 2
Let ∼ be the following binary relation on M 1 :
As < 1 is transitive, ∼ is an equivalence relation. For Γ ∈ W 1 we write Γ/∼ for the equivalence class {∆ ∈ W 1 : Γ ∼ ∆}, and for X ⊆ W 1 we write X/∼ for the set {Γ/∼ : Γ ∈ X} of equivalence classes having a non-empty intersection with X. The domain W 2 of M 2 is now defined to be the set W 1 /∼ of ∼-equivalence classes in M 1 . The relations on M 2 are: < 2 is induced existentially from < 1 , and R 2 is the transitive closure of the relation induced existentially from R 1 . Formally:
is the transitive closure of R 0 2 . We set h 2 (p) = {Γ/∼ : Γ ∈ W 1 , p ∈ Γ} for each atom p ∈ P V . This defines the model M 2 .
LEMMA 6.4 (filtration) For all
Proof. This is proved in [24, lemmas 3 
Proof. Let Γ, ∆ ∈ W 1 . If Γ < 1 ∆ then Γ/∼ < 2 ∆/∼ by definition of < 2 . Conversely, if Γ/∼ < 2 ∆/∼ then by definition of < 2 there are Γ , ∆ ∈ W 1 with Γ ∼ Γ , ∆ ∼ ∆ , and Γ < 1 ∆ . The definition of ∼ gives Γ ≤ 1 Γ and ∆ ≤ 1 ∆, so Γ < 1 ∆ by transitivity of < 1 . We conclude that Γ/∼ < 2 ∆/∼ iff Γ < 1 ∆. Let C ⊆ W 2 . If C is a < 2 -cluster in M 2 , let Γ/∼ ∈ C be arbitrary. Then C = {w ∈ W 2 : Γ/∼ < 2 w < 2 Γ/∼}. By the above,
The first part of the lemma follows. Let C be a < 2 -cluster. Then C has the form D/∼ for a < 1 -cluster D = C, and by definition of ∼ we have Γ ∼ ∆ iff Γ ∩ Ψ = ∆ ∩ Ψ for each Γ, ∆ ∈ D. Hence, the map f : C → ℘(Ψ) given by f (Γ/∼) = Γ ∩ Ψ is well defined and one-one, so |C| ≤ |℘(Ψ)| and C is finite (this is [24, lemma 3.4 
]).
Let w ∈ C and u ∈ W 2 , with R 0 2 wu. Pick Γ ∈ w and ∆ ∈ u with R 1 Γ∆. By the above and lemma 6.3, C is R 1 -generated, so ∆ ∈ C, and therefore u ∈ C. It follows easily that C is an R 2 -generated subset of W 2 (see also [24, lemma 3.6 
]). 2
By [24, lemma 3.3] , the frame of M 2 validates all axioms of the system of §3.1 except perhaps axiom 5. The following can now be obtained from [24, lemmas 3.5-3.6] . LEMMA 6.6 (λ, ρ-lemma) Let w ∈ M 2 .
1. If w is < 2 -reflexive then R 2 (w) is a subset of a < 2 -cluster.
2. If w is < 2 -irreflexive, then there are unique < 2 -clusters λ(w), ρ(w) such that R 2 (w) = λ(w) ∪ {w} ∪ ρ(w). For every t ∈ M 2 , u ∈ λ(w), and v ∈ ρ(w), we have t < 2 w iff t < 2 u, and t > 2 w iff t > 2 v.
Taking t = u and t = v, we obtain u < 2 w < 2 v for every u ∈ λ(w) and v ∈ ρ(w). We now write down formulas to define individual elements within a < 2 -cluster. By definition of ∼ in (5), this definition is independent of the choice of Γ, and obviously χ w ∈ Γ. The set {χ w : w ∈ M 2 } is finite, because Ψ is finite.
REMARK 6.8 If w, u ∈ M 2 , say w = Γ/∼ and u = ∆/∼, and χ w , χ u ∈ Θ for some Θ ∈ M 0 , then Ψ ∩ Γ = Ψ ∩ ∆, and so χ w is equivalent to χ u .
These formulas are quite useful -firstly in the following lemma.
LEMMA 6.9 Let C be a < 2 -cluster in M 2 . Then (C, R 2 C) is a connected frame.
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that C is a < 2 -cluster in M 2 that is the union of disjoint non-empty R 2 -generated sets X, Y . Let α = w∈X χ w . Then for any Γ ∈ C we have α ∈ Γ ⇐⇒ Γ/∼ ∈ X.
Choose any Γ ∈ C and let
We show that this is consistent. Since Γ is closed under conjunction, it suffices to take arbitrary γ ∈ Γ and show that δ = 3α ∧ 3¬α ∧ F γ ∧ P γ is consistent. Choose any Γ X ∈ X and Γ Y ∈ Y . By lemma 6.5, C is a
By temporal axioms, GP γ ∈ Γ as well, so F δ ∈ Γ. If δ is inconsistent then ¬δ and hence G¬δ are provable, so G¬δ ∈ Γ, contradicting its consistency. So δ is consistent. So we may take ∆ ∈ M 0 with ∆ ⊇ ∆ 0 . By definition of ∆ 0 we have Γ < 0 ∆ < 0 Γ, so ∆ ∈ M 1 and ∆ ∈ C. As 3α, 3¬α ∈ ∆, we may find ∆ X , ∆ Y ∈ R 0 (∆) with α ∈ ∆ X and ¬α ∈ ∆ Y . Then ∆ X , ∆ Y ∈ R 1 (∆) as M 1 is a generated submodel of M 0 . By lemma 6.3, C is an R 1 -generated subset of M 1 , so ∆ X , ∆ Y ∈ C as well.
Let w = ∆/∼, w X = ∆ X /∼, and w Y = ∆ Y /∼. By (6), w X ∈ X and w Y ∈ Y . By definition of R 2 , we have w X , w Y ∈ R 2 (w). Since w ∈ X ∪ Y , this contradicts that X and Y are disjoint and R 2 -generated. 2
Hinterland
DEFINITION 6.10 We define the hinterland H(Γ) of a set Γ ∈ M 1 to be the set R 1 (Γ)/∼. It is the set of elements of M 2 that Γ 'directly sees'.
Plainly, H(Γ) ⊆ R 2 (Γ/∼), and by lemma 6.6 the latter is contained in either a single < 2 -cluster or the union of two such clusters with a singleton. So by lemma 6.5, H(Γ) is finite.
The following is trivial but will be absolutely vital later. In a way, our entire proof hinges on it.
COROLLARY 6.11 Let Γ ∈ M 1 , w = Γ/∼, and 3ψ ∈ Ψ, and suppose that M 2 , w |= 3ψ. Then M 2 , u |= ψ for some u ∈ H(Γ).
Proof. As M 2 , w |= 3ψ, by lemma 6.4 we have M 1 , Γ |= 3ψ. So there is ∆ ∈ R 1 (Γ) with M 1 , ∆ |= ψ. Let u = ∆/∼ ∈ H(Γ). By the lemma again, M 2 , u |= ψ.
This completes our study of M 2 .
Model M 3
We now do a selective filtration of M 2 to deliver our first verifiably finite model: an R 2 -generated submodel M 3 ⊆ M 2 satisfying ϕ 0 . We select the points of M 2 to include in M 3 in four steps.
1. Let Λ 0 = {P ϕ : ϕ is satisfied in M 1 }. Then Λ 0 is consistent. For suppose that ϕ 0 , . . . , ϕ n−1 are satisfied in M 1 at ∆ 0 , . . . , ∆ n−1 , say. Choose i < n such that |{j < n : ∆ j ≤ 1 ∆ i }| is maximal. It follows by linearity and transitivity of < 1 that for every j < n we have ∆ j ≤ 1 ∆ i . By lemma 3.2, F ∈ ∆ i , so there is Γ ∈ M 1 with ∆ i < 1 Γ. Then ∆ 0 , . . . , ∆ n−1 < 1 Γ, so P ϕ 0 , . . . , P ϕ n−1 ∈ Γ, proving consistency of Λ 0 . Let Λ ⊇ Λ 0 be maximal consistent. Then Λ ∈ M 0 . For every Γ ∈ M 1 we have ϕ ∈ Γ ⇒ P ϕ ∈ Λ 0 ⊆ Λ, so Γ < 0 Λ. This means that Λ ∈ M 1 and that Λ is a
It is an R 1 -generated subset of W 1 . We select the whole of C ∞ /∼, a finite < 2 -cluster and an R 2 -generated subset of W 2 , and add it to M 3 .
2. Do mirror image of step 1, calling the cluster C −∞ . Possibly, C −∞ = C +∞ .
3. Now consider in turn each ψ ∈ Ψ (if any) such that ψ and F G¬ψ are both satisfied in M 1 . Then some (unique irreflexive) ∆ ∈ M 1 contains G¬ψ ∧ HF ψ. Such a ∆ is plainly irreflexive, and by linearity it is unique. For existence, using linearity and (by lemma 3.2) lack of a least element of < 1 we may find Γ ∈ M 1 containing F ψ ∧ F G¬ψ. By the Prior axiom, which is provable by corollary 3.5, F (G¬ψ ∧ HF ψ) ∈ Γ, so there is ∆ > 1 Γ as required. Select the whole finite set R 2 (∆/∼) and add it to M 3 .
4. Also do mirror image of step 3.
Plainly, M 3 is a non-empty finite R 2 -generated submodel of M 2 .
DEFINITION 6.12 For models M ⊆ N , we write M Ψ N if M, w |= ψ iff N , w |= ψ for every w ∈ M and ψ ∈ Ψ.
The following is fairly standard.
LEMMA 6.13 Let M = (W, <, R, h) be any R 2 -generated submodel of M 2 extending M 3 . Then M Ψ M 2 , and ϕ 0 is satisfied in M. Moreover, if w ∈ M, F ψ ∈ Ψ, and M, w |= F ψ, then 1. there is u ∈ C ∞ /∼ with M, u |= ψ, or 2. there is irreflexive u ∈ M with u > w, and v ∈ M with w < v ≤ u R v and M, v |= ψ.
A mirror image holds for formulas P ψ ∈ Ψ.
Proof. We prove that M Ψ M 2 by induction on ψ. The main cases are F ψ, P ψ, and 3ψ. For the forward direction, if M, w |= F ψ then there is u > w in M with M, u |= ψ. Inductively, M 2 , u |= ψ, and plainly, u > 2 w because M ⊆ M 2 . Hence, M 2 , w |= F ψ. The cases P ψ and 3ψ are similarly proved.
We consider the converse direction now. If M 2 , w |= 3ψ then M 2 , u |= ψ for some u ∈ R 2 (w). As M is an R 2 -generated submodel of M 2 , u ∈ M as well, and Rwu. Inductively, M, u |= ψ, so M, w |= 3ψ.
Assume now that M 2 , w |= F ψ. Take any Γ ∈ w, so that w = Γ/∼. By lemma 6.4, F ψ ∈ Γ.
There are now two cases. Suppose first that GF ψ ∈ Γ. Referring to the definition of M 3 , we have F ψ ∈ Λ as Γ < 1 Λ, so there is Λ > 1 Λ in M 1 containing ψ. Let u = Λ /∼. By lemma 6.4 again, M 2 , u |= ψ. But Λ < 1 Λ as well, because Λ is
Alternatively, F G¬ψ ∈ Γ. By definition of M 3 , there is ∆ ∈ M 1 with G¬ψ ∧ HF ψ ∈ ∆ and R 2 (∆/∼) ⊆ M 3 . If Γ ≥ 1 ∆ then G¬ψ ∈ Γ, contradicting its consistency. So by linearity, Γ < 1 ∆.
Let C = {Ξ ∈ R 1 (∆) : Ξ < 1 ∆}. Then C = ∅ by the mirror image of axiom 4d. Let Ξ ∈ C. Then F ψ ∈ Ξ, so there is Θ > 1 Ξ containing ψ. Since G¬ψ ∈ ∆, by linearity we must have Θ ≤ 1 ∆, so by axiom 4c, Θ ∈ C ∪ {∆}. By axiom 4b, Γ < 1 Θ.
Let So in either case we have M, w |= F ψ as required. This also establishes the 'moreover' part: in (1) we have u = Λ /∼ and in (2) u = ∆/∼ and v = Θ/∼. The case of P ψ is handled similarly. This completes the induction.
As ϕ 0 is satisfied in M 1 , we must have P ϕ 0 ∈ Λ, and by lemma 6.4, M 2 , Λ/∼ |= P ϕ 0 . Recall that P ϕ 0 ∈ Ψ. By the above, M, Λ/∼ |= P ϕ 0 , and it follows that ϕ 0 is satisfied in M. 2
Links
The model M 3 can have consecutive < 3 -clusters that are actually adjacent, with no intervening point. In our eventual model over R, <-clusters correspond to open sets, and we have the problem of finding something suitable to put between them. So we would like to arrange, possibly in a larger model than M 3 , that any two such clusters have something in common that we can use as intervening material. This common something will be a certain small submodel, which we call a link. Given Γ ∈ M 1 , consider two finite subsets of M 2 : R 2 (Γ/∼), and its subset H(Γ) = R 1 (Γ)/∼. The first is dependent on R 2 and the details of this are not available to Γ. So let us focus on the second, H(Γ). We would like to find a formula γ ∈ Γ that determines the isomorphism type of the frame H Γ = (H(Γ), R 2 H(Γ)), in the sense that H ∆ ∼ = H Γ for any ∆ containing γ. We would also like γ to determine some of the formulas true at points in H Γ . Then we will be able to use the Prior axiom to find faithful copies of H Γ in adjacent clusters.
It is not clear how to write such a γ in general, because there may be w, u ∈ H(Γ) with R 2 (w, u) but no 'witnesses' ∆ ∈ w, Θ ∈ u with R 1 ∆Θ. However, if for every ∆ ∈ R 1 (Γ) and u ∈ H(Γ) there exists Θ ∈ u with R 1 ∆Θ -a property that can be enforced by a formula -then R 2 H(Γ) is forced to be the biggest possible relation, H(Γ) × H(Γ). The isomorphism type of H Γ is then determined.
It may not be immediately obvious that there are any Γ like this, but in fact they are quite common. Any Γ has this property if H(∆) = H(Γ) for every ∆ ∈ R 1 (Γ), a condition that holds if R • 1 (Γ) = ∅, and more generally if H(Γ) is of minimal cardinality in some suitable sense. We now formalise this and take it further.
4. Take any Θ ∈ R 1 (∆). Certainly, H(Θ) ⊆ H(∆). To show the converse, take any u ∈ H(∆) and pick Ξ ∈ R 1 (∆)∩u. By assumption, η Γ ∈ ∆, so w∈H(Γ) χ w ∈ Ξ, and hence χ w ∈ Ξ for some w ∈ H(Γ). But 23χ w ∈ ∆, so 3χ w ∈ Θ and there is Ξ ∈ R 1 (Θ) containing χ w . Now ∆ is < 1 -reflexive. It follows from axiom 4b that R 1 (∆) is contained in a < 1 -cluster. Since Ξ, Ξ ∈ R 1 (∆), we have Ξ < 1 Ξ < 1 Ξ. Since χ w ∈ Ξ ∩ Ξ , we also have Ξ ∩ Ψ = Ξ ∩ Ψ. We conclude that Ξ ∼ Ξ . Hence, Ξ ∈ u, so u ∈ H(Θ). This proves that ∆ is a link. By the preceding part, η ∆ ∈ ∆, and we were given that η Γ ∈ ∆. By lemma 6.15, η Γ , η ∆ are equivalent. So ∆ is similar to Γ. 2 LEMMA 6.17 Let Γ ∈ M 1 be a link. Then R 2 (w, u) for any w, u ∈ H(Γ).
So the hinterland of a link has a fixed frame structure. Similar links also share some model properties. It can be shown that there is a bijection from H(Γ) to H(∆) that preserves the truth in M 2 of all formulas in Ψ. However, the following more limited statement is sufficient for our later work.
LEMMA 6.18 Let Γ, ∆ ∈ M 1 be similar links, let w ∈ H(Γ), and u ∈ H(∆). Then M 2 , w |= 3ψ iff M 2 , u |= 3ψ for every formula 3ψ ∈ Ψ.
Proof. By lemma 6.17, we can suppose without loss of generality that w = Γ/∼ and u = ∆/∼. We have η Γ , η ∆ ∈ Γ ∩ ∆ by the hypotheses and lemma 6.16 (2) . Suppose that M 2 , w |= 3ψ. By the filtration lemma (6.4), 3ψ ∈ Γ. Take Γ ∈ R 1 (Γ) with ψ ∈ Γ and let v = Γ /∼ ∈ H(Γ). Then 23χ v ∈ ∆, so there is ∆ ∈ R 1 (∆) containing χ v . By definition of χ v we have Ψ ∩ Γ = Ψ ∩ ∆ , so ψ ∈ ∆ and hence 3ψ ∈ ∆. The filtration lemma yields M 2 , u |= 3ψ. The converse is similar. 2
Model M 4
Our next model arranges that any two consecutive clusters either have an irreflexive point between them, or contain similar links.
DEFINITION 6.19
1. For a model M = (W, <, R, h) and X, Y ⊆ W , we write X < Y if x < y for every x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . We abbreviate {x} < Y to x < Y , etc.
2. If X, Y ⊆ M 2 , we say that X and Y contain similar links if there is a link Γ ∈ X and a link ∆ ∈ Y that is similar to Γ.
be the (finite) number of similarity types of links in the set
where Γ ∈ C and ∆ ∈ D are arbitrary. The value does not depend on the choice of Γ, ∆ (since C, D are < 1 -clusters). Since C is R 1 -generated by lemma 6.3, by lemma 6.16(1) it contains a link, so (C, D) > 0.
The following important technical lemma is needed just below.
LEMMA 6.20 Let C be a < 2 -cluster in M 2 , and let w ∈ M 2 with C < 2 w / ∈ C. Then there is a < 2 -irreflexive u ∈ M 2 such that:
2.
C and λ(u) contain similar links, 3. if w is < 2 -irreflexive and u < 2 w, then (ρ(u), λ(w)) < (C, λ(w)).
(See lemma 6.6 for λ, ρ.) The mirror image also holds.
Proof. By lemma 6.5, C is a < 1 -cluster in M 1 , so by lemma 6.3 it is an R 1 -generated subset of M 1 . Using lemma 6.16(1), pick a link Γ ∈ C. Also pick any ∆ ∈ w. Since C < 2 w / ∈ C, we have Γ < 1 ∆ < 1 Γ. So there is a formula δ with δ ∈ Γ and G¬δ ∈ ∆.
If w is < 2 -irreflexive, then ∆ is < 1 -irreflexive, and in that case we can suppose that Hδ ∈ ∆ as well. As Γ is a link, lemma 6.16 yields η Γ ∈ Γ. So η Γ ∧ δ ∈ Γ and G¬(η Γ ∧ δ) ∈ ∆, and as Γ < 1 Γ, we obtain F (η Γ ∧ δ) ∧ F G¬(η Γ ∧ δ) ∈ Γ. By the Prior axiom, F (G¬(η Γ ∧ δ) ∧ HF (η Γ ∧ δ)) ∈ Γ, and this lets us take Θ > 1 Γ in M 1 with
So Θ is < 1 -irreflexive. Let u = Θ/∼. Then u is < 2 -irreflexive. Since Γ < 1 Θ, we have C < 2 u. Since G¬δ ∈ ∆ and HF δ ∈ Θ, we see that ∆ < 1 Θ. By linearity, Θ ≤ 1 ∆, so u ≤ 2 w. As in lemma 6.13, it follows from (8) that some Θ ∈ {Θ} ∪ λ(u) contains η Γ ∧ δ. Bearing in mind that η Γ implies 2η Γ , we see that some Ξ ∈ λ(u) contains η Γ . As λ(u) is a < 1 -cluster, Ξ < 1 Ξ. So by lemma 6.16(4), Ξ is a link similar to Γ. Suppose that w is irreflexive and u < 2 w, so that ρ(u) < 2 λ(w) by lemma 6.6 (possibly ρ(u) = λ(w)). We have Hδ ∈ ∆ in this case, and by (8) , G¬(η Γ ∧δ) ∈ Θ. So η Γ / ∈ Ξ for every Ξ ∈ M 1 with Θ < 1 Ξ < 1 ∆. Therefore, there is no link Ξ similar to Γ with Θ < 1 Ξ < 1 ∆. Since there certainly is such a link with Γ < 1 Ξ < 1 ∆, namely Ξ = Γ, we see that (ρ(u), λ(w)) < (C, λ(w)). 2 DEFINITION 6.21 Let M = (W, <, R, h) be a submodel of M 2 .
1. We say that <-clusters C, D in M are
In each case, C < D. Consecutive clusters have no <-reflexive points between them, but may have <-irreflexive ones. Adjacent clusters have nothing between them.
2. We say that M is good if it is finite, R 2 -generated, and for every < 2 -cluster
3. We say that M is perfect if it is good and C and D contain similar links whenever C, D are adjacent <-clusters in M.
LEMMA 6.22 Any good submodel of M 2 extends to a perfect submodel of M 2 .
Proof.
We prove the lemma by induction on d(M), which is finite because M is. If it is zero then M has no defects and is therefore perfect, and there is nothing to prove. So assume that d(M) > 0 and assume the lemma for all good M ⊆ M 2 with d(M ) < d(M). Pick any defect (C, D) in M, and pick any w ∈ D. Then C < 2 w < 2 C. Let u ∈ M 2 be as provided by lemma 6.20, and let N be the submodel of M 2 consisting of M together with R 2 (u). We let < denote < 2 N . So Let N be obtained from N by adding R 2 (v), so that
where we write < for
Inductively, there is perfect P with N ⊆ P ⊆ M 2 . Since M ⊆ P, this completes the proof. 
Model M 5 over R
Fix an enumeration without repetitions of the < 4 -clusters in M 4 as C 0 , . . . , C k , with k ≥ 0 and C 0 < 4 C 1 < 4 · · · < 4 C k .
We have C 0 = C −∞ /∼ and C k = C +∞ /∼. Possibly, k = 0 and C 0 = C k . DEFINITION 6.23 Let i < k. As M 4 is perfect, (C i , C i+1 ) is not a defect, so there are only two possibilities.
1. There is u ∈ M 4 with C i < 4 u < 4 C i+1 and u / ∈ C i ∪ C i+1 . Then u is not in any < 4 -cluster, so is irreflexive. We must have C i = λ(u) and C i+1 = ρ(u). It follows that u is unique. We define u i to be this u, and we say that C i is right-open and C i+1 is left-open.
2.
C i and C i+1 contain similar links. Let ∆ i ∈ C i and Σ i+1 ∈ C i+1 be similar links, and define
In this case, we say that C i is right-closed and C i+1 is left-closed.
We also say that C 0 is left-open and C k right-open.
DEFINITION 6.24
Let i ≤ k.
1. Plainly, (C i , R 4 C i ) is a finite S4-frame, and by lemma 6.9 it is connected. Choose f i : R → C i as per theorem 5.10. By the theorem, for each w ∈ C i we can pick x w ∈ R with f i (x w ) = w. As C i is finite, there are bounds l, r ∈ R with l < x w < r for all w ∈ C i . If C i is left-closed, by the theorem we can assume further that l is f i -good and f i (l) = s i . Similarly, if C i is right-closed we can suppose that r is f i -good and f i (r) = d i . To simplify notation, by some scaling we can assume that l = 0 and r = 1. In summary: Note that dom g 0 is an open interval of R. We are not concerned about exactly which interval it is. Now suppose 1 ≤ i ≤ k. • is finitely axiomatisable, answering an implicit problem of Shehtman [24] ,
• has PSPACE-complete complexity,
• has no strongly complete axiomatisation,
• is not Kripke complete.
We list some remaining open problems. First, some complexity problems.
PROBLEM 7.1 For fixed k ≥ 0, what is the complexity of the set of L-formulas that are satisfiable over R and involve at most k 2-operators?
The methods of [19] may be helpful. If the answer is 'NP-complete', it might suggest that the language with F , P , and 2 could be more tractable in practice than the more expressive language with Until and Since. The operations of sum (+) and shuffle in §5, plus two more involving countable iterations, can be used to specify models over R in a finite way. By results in [4] , any model over R can be specified up to any desired degree of first-order equivalence in such a way, so any satisfiable L-formula has a model specified by these operations. This leads to the following problem.
PROBLEM 7.2
Investigate the complexity of model checking for the language L for models over R specified by a finite sequence of operations of the above kinds.
This problem was investigated in [6] for the language with Until and Since, and roughly speaking, exponential time upper bounds were obtained. One may also wish to develop alternative reasoning systems for L over R, such as tableaux, and synthesis methods along the lines of [6, 22] . The end result of this research could justify the promotion of L as a viable language for specification and reasoning over the real line, possibly a more attractive one than the very expressive language with Until and Since.
It may be of interest to study the logic of R in the sublanguage of L without H: so the only non-boolean connectives are G and 2. This logic is PSPACE-complete, by the same argument as in theorem 4.4. Theorem 4.1 survives: there is no strongly complete axiomatisation. The proof of theorem 4.3 can be adapted to show that it is not Kripke complete, using the formula F (p ∧ G¬p ∧ ¬a ∧ ¬b ∧ 3a ∧ 3b ∧ G¬(3a ∧ 3b) ∧ F G¬a) ∧ G(F p → ¬a ∧ ¬b).
The Prior axiom is no longer expressible, but a variant F p ∧ F G¬p → F (G¬p ∧ 3p) can be used instead. [15] (see also Shehtman's habilitation thesis).
